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Mike Bechthold. Flying to Victory: Raymond Collishaw and the
Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941. Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2017. Pp. 281.
Historians and senior Royal Air Force (RAF) officers generally agree
that the leadership provided by Air Marshal Arthur Tedder and Air
Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham was a key component in the success
achieved by the RAF in the Western Desert during the Second World
War.1 In stark contrast, the leadership of Air Chief Marshal Sir
Arthur Longmore and Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw, in the
period preceding the arrival of Coningham, is viewed less positively.
The reasons for this include the widespread acceptance of Tedder’s
narrative of events, the way the RAF became associated with the
land operation defeats and the belief that the only opposition facing
the RAF in the Western Desert was the relatively weak Regia
Aeronautica.2 In Flying to Victory: Raymond Collishaw and the
Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941, Mike Bechthold, a historian
of the First and Second World Wars and the author of a series of
battlefield guides, argues that Collishaw’s leadership in the early air
campaign in the desert has been significantly misrepresented and
wholly undervalued. In evaluating this neglected period of the desert
war, Bechthold challenges the narrative that has portrayed Collishaw
as a man who lacked the necessary intellectual and administrative
skills to rise to the challenge of defeating the combined forces of the
Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica.
To support his case, Bechthold uses a comprehensive array of
primary and secondary sources. He begins the analysis with an
examination of the breadth and depth of Collishaw’s operational
experience in the First World War, the Crimea, Kurdistan, Palestine,
Egypt, Sudan, and with the Royal Navy. These experiences required
him to work with army and naval commanders in operations supported
1  
See, for example, “The End of the Beginning: A Symposium on the Land/Air Cooperation in The Mediterranean War 1940-43,” Bracknell Paper No. 3, 1992; and
Wing Commander Dave Smathers, “‘We Never Talk About That Now’: Air-Land
Integration in the Western Desert 1940-42,” Air Power Review 20, no. 3 (2017):
32-48.
2  
I. Gooderson, “Doctrine from the crucible: The British air-land experience in the
Second World War,” Air Power Review 9, no. 6 (2006): 7-9; and H. Smyth, “From
Coningham to Project Coningham-Keyes: Did British Forces Relearn Historical
Air-Land Cooperation Lessons During Operation ‘Telic’?” Defence Studies 7, no. 2
(2007): 263-264.
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by extraordinarily fragile lines of supply. Bechthold suggests that
Collishaw’s experience in this environment made him especially
equipped to deal with the array of challenges facing the RAF in
North Africa, in terms of personnel, shortage of equipment and the
omnipresent inter-service dysfunction. Flying to Victory consists of
ten chapters, comprising 178 pages of text, 24 pages of pictures and
7 of maps. The book generally follows the chronological progress of
the RAF’s involvement in the battles of the Western Desert, from
1939, when the Italians were contemplating whether or not to enter
the war on the side of the Germans, to July 1941, a month after the
British failed in their attempt to relieve the fortress of Tobruk—this
was the period when the RAF was fighting the combined German
and Italian air forces.
Bechthold explains how Collishaw optimised the relatively few
aircraft at his disposal in a campaign designed to create the illusion
of RAF superiority. The campaign began with attacks against the
Regia Aeronautica on the ground, before the focus of the offensive
operations changed to deliver small-scale attacks across a broad front
in order to unbalance the larger Italian air force and blunt its offensive
activities. The success of this campaign reduced Italian air attacks on
British soldiers and prevented what had threatened to be a shattering
reverse. The case is well constructed, well written and easy to follow,
though, at times, it narrowly avoids being hagiographic. Bechthold
contends that the paucity of modern aircraft at Collishaw’s disposal
limited his options to such an extent that the dynamism, enthusiasm
and leadership he exhibited during the early fighting, particularly
during Operation Crusader, has never been properly recognised.
The very different views the army and RAF held about the
way air power should be employed was at the heart of the many
problems in planning and coordinating joint operations between the
British Army and RAF. Bechthold shows how, despite the difficult
inter-service environment, Collishaw developed personal relationships
with Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor, Major-General Noel
Beresford-Pierce and Brigadier William Gott in a way that gained
their trust in his views on how air power should be employed.
General Archibald Wavell, however, wanted the RAF to provide
comprehensive direct support to the army and, whenever RAF
aircraft were employed in other duties, chose to believe there was a
direct correlation between the air power the army was given and its
performance on the battlefield. Wavell praised Collishaw when things
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went well, but during the retreat from the frontier, when the fighting
on the ground resulted in an ignominious defeat, Wavell concluded
that the RAF was chiefly responsible for the rout and was unduly
hasty in reporting this view directly to the War Cabinet in London
without consulting Longmore.
Tedder believed that Collishaw had exhibited recklessness in
supporting the army’s ground operations to reach Tripoli because
he thought Collishaw had unwittingly allowed the logistics train
to become perilously close to collapse and that only good luck had
prevented disaster.
Collishaw later contended that he fully understood the risks
and benefits of maintaining the offensive. Bechthold also shows
how Tedder’s assessment of Collishaw’s ability was transmitted in
‘strictly private’ correspondence with the Chief of the Air Staff, Air
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, and his deputy Air Chief Marshal
Sir Wilfrid Freeman. The messages were replete with smears about
Collishaw’s character and ability and indicate that there was a degree
of personal animosity between the two men. Tedder counselled that
Collishaw was naïve, brutal and rash. He compared him to a “village
blacksmith” and “a bull in a china shop,” who had a tendency “to go
off half-cock.” Collishaw’s lack of university education may also have
played a part as Tedder thought Collishaw “lacks a sophisticated
analysis of events” and was, therefore, unfit “to tackle the Hun and
the Army” (p. 187). In this context, the way Collishaw’s reputation
was later callously undermined by Tedder becomes easier to
understand. It is clear that, despite Collishaw’s many operational
successes in the face of superior enemy forces, he simply did not
fit in with the type of senior officers reaching North Africa in late
1941. Tedder clearly preferred the company of Air Vice-Marshal Sir
Arthur Coningham, the urbane New Zealander, whose administrative
skills were as haphazard as Collishaw’s. Without the support of Air
Commodore Thomas Elmhirst, whose talent for administration were
renown,3 Coningham may have been less favourably compared to
Collishaw.
In the atmosphere of recrimination levelled at the RAF in the
aftermath of the defeats in Greece and Crete, Portal and Tedder
wanted to avoid the RAF becoming subordinate to the army in
the desert. Bechtold explains how, with Portal’s approval, Tedder
V. Orange, Coningham (London: Methuen, 1990), 89.
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devised a strategy to gain the army’s confidence before undermining
its officers’ claims that only full-scale direct support to their units
was the best way to win the battles in the desert. Consequently,
Tedder initially overruled Collishaw by supporting the army’s request
to keep Hurricane fighters within the besieged fortress of Tobruk.
Then, in contrast to the way Collishaw had vehemently fought for the
RAF’s independent activities in the desert, Tedder decided to accede
to Beresford-Pierce’s demands for an ‘air umbrella’ during Operation
Battleaxe in the belief that the army’s likely failure to relieve Tobruk
would help garner Churchill’s support for the RAF’s independent
control of air power. Tedder also agreed to Churchill’s demand to
‘throw everything in’ to support the beleaguered forces on Crete
before blaming Collishaw for not reigning in his aircraft when losses
increased substantially. While Tedder’s plan to undermine the army’s
arguments was ultimately successful, Collishaw had successfully
fought the same battle, albeit with Longmore’s support, without being
party to the flawed operational design or the consequent loss of life.
Bechthold argues that Tedder’s decision to dismiss Collishaw
after Operation Battleaxe was based on the subjective perception
that Collishaw did not have the capacity for higher-level leadership
and would be unable to cope with the increasing complexities of
the desert war. The lack of chemistry between the two men is only
lightly examined, though it appears possible that it had something to
do with their very different backgrounds, personalities and contacts.
Longmore trusted Collishaw and the empathy between them might
have had something to do with their time in the Royal Navy (RN)
before joining the RAF. It would have been interesting to learn how
deeply Portal felt threatened by Longmore’s repeated requests for
more aircraft to be sent to the Middle East, which had been strongly
echoed by his fellow army and RN commanders and were reinforced
by the assessment of General Jan Smuts, the South African President,
who was one of Churchill’s trusted confidants.4 Collishaw’s closeness
to Longmore may have prompted Portal’s distrust and Tedder’s
animosity.

J. Terraine, The Right of the Line: The RAF in the European War 1939-1945
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 308; D. Richards, Portal of Hungerford
(London: Heinemann, 1977), 230-231; and Robin Higham, Diary of a Disaster:
British Aid to Greece, 1940-1941 (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1986),
160-164.
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As you would expect from a project that started as a PhD
dissertation, the book is very well researched. The only minor criticism
is that Bechthold has been too ready to accept Collishaw’s belief
that air-to-ground, close air support missions were disproportionately
expensive in men and aircraft. Recent research has suggested that
the pilots’ subjective fears were reinforced by the way the topic was
taught at the RAF Staff College and articulated in doctrine.5 Overall,
the book provides a significant contribution to the literature of the
military history of the fighting in the desert during the Second World
War. It is likely to be of interest to scholars, amateur historians and
the general audience alike.
david stubbs , independent researcher

Alistair McCluskey, “The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British AirLand Battle, 1918-1945,” in Changing War: The British Army, The Hundred Days
Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918, Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray,
eds. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 238, 244; Jonathan Boff, “Air/Land
Integration in the 100 days: The Case of Third Army,” Air Power Review 12, no.
3 (2009), 80; Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Years of Combat (London: Collins, 1963),
240; Wing Commander R.A. Mason MA RAF, The Royal Air Force Staff College
1922-1972 (RAF Staff College Bracknell, 1972), 1; AP 956, B. E. Smythies D.F.C., A
selection of lectures and essays from the work of officers attending the first course at
the RAF Staff College 1922-1923, Experiences During the War, 1914-1918 (London:
Air Ministry, 1923), 80, 86; A.D. Harvey, “The Royal Air Force and Close Support,
1918-1940,” War in History 15, no. 4 (2008), 466-468; and R.P. Hallion, Strike from
the Sky: The history of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945 (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1989),
16-17.
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